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Charles: Deconstructing the Paradox

NOTE
Deconstructing the Paradox of the
Constitutional Incarceration of Innocent
Citizens
In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) transfer denied.
Rebecca Charles*

I. INTRODUCTION
Missouri is not sure whether it is a manifest injustice or a violation of
due process to continue incarcerating an innocent person, even for life.1 This
is a shocking notion for average citizens who expect the criminal justice
system to exact justice accurately and fairly. Much of judicial precedent is
not entirely intuitive to ordinary citizens, and yet lawful incarceration of
innocents is a paradox that moves beyond unintuitive to alarming. Rodney
Lincoln’s story epitomizes many of the most alarming aspects of this paradox.
In 1985, Rodney Lincoln was convicted of the brutal assault of two
young girls and the murder and assault of their mother.2 In the more than
thirty years following his convictions, the already feeble evidence used to
incarcerate Mr. Lincoln crumbled.3 With no evidence remaining to support
his conviction, Mr. Lincoln petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge
his continued detention.4 He was unsuccessful.5 The Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Western District denied Mr. Lincoln’s petition, perpetuating
the convoluted and flawed precedent that governs the legal procedures of
habeas corpus.6

* B.A., Truman State University, 2006; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2020; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2018–2019. I am
grateful to Professor Uphoff for his insight, guidance, and support during the writing
of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.
1. See In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11, 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
2. Id. at 15.
3. Id. at 15–16.
4. Id. at 16.
5. Id. at 15.
6. Id. at 23.
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Habeas corpus is a procedural safeguard that allows an individual
detained by a government to challenge the legitimacy of his detention.7 While
the exact parameters of habeas corpus vary across jurisdictions, its common
underlying premise provides for release of a detainee when his detention
violates the law.8 No court binding the Missouri Court of Appeals has ever
determined that the incarceration of an innocent person is unlawful.
While plenty of precedent exists to conclude that such a detention
violates fundamental fairness, the Western District in In re Lincoln v. Cassady
was unwilling to make such a finding without the prior blessing of the
Supreme Court of Missouri.9 As a result, there is no procedural pathway for
a convicted and incarcerated person sentenced to anything short of death to
convincingly demonstrate his innocence and obtain relief under Missouri law.
For Mr. Lincoln, who received two consecutive life sentences plus fifteen
years, this lack of a procedural pathway made the absence of evidence
remaining to support his conviction irrelevant.10
Courts upholding the position that habeas corpus cannot remedy the
incarceration of an innocent person flaunt finality as a compelling justification
for denying relief.11 Respect for the finality of judgments and convictions
lends stability, efficiency, and legitimacy to the courts. But finality is an
unconvincing justification for affirming a conviction when the convicted is
ready and able to prove his innocence. Courts also rely on executive clemency
to clean up the injustice that results from this position. As the chief executives
of their jurisdictions, governors have statutory authority to grant pardons and
commute sentences through clemency. But clemency is an ineffective
solution when examined critically against the massive injustice that results
from wrongful convictions left undisturbed.
Part II of this Note explains the facts and procedural background of
Rodney Lincoln’s convictions for manslaughter and two counts of first-degree
assault. Part III outlines the legal background relevant to the court’s ruling,
including the expansion of habeas corpus to freestanding claims of actual
innocence and the inapplicability of that expansion to non-death penalty cases.
Part IV details the court’s ruling in Mr. Lincoln’s case, which acknowledged
Mr. Lincoln’s compelling case of innocence but could not grant habeas relief
due to procedural barriers. Part V explains the insufficiency of finality as a
justification for perpetuating the procedural barriers to habeas relief and the
inadequacy of the court-endorsed remedy of executive clemency to cure the
consequences of those barriers. It then offers concrete solutions to the

7. Id. at 16 (citing State ex rel Amrine v Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 545–46 (Mo.
2003) (en banc)).
8. Habeas
Corpus,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/habeas_corpus# [perma.cc/6VNM-R73K] (last
visited Dec. 15, 2019). In this context, “the law” encompasses constitutional,
statutory, and common law.
9. Lincoln, 517 S.W.3d at 23.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 16.
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procedural gap that allows innocents to be lawfully and constitutionally
detained, even for life.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On the night of April 27, 1982, a man entered the home of JoAnn Tate.12
The man assaulted and murdered Ms. Tate before he turned his attention to
her two daughters, Melissa, age seven, and Renee, age four.13 The “bad man,”
as Melissa would later call him, sexually assaulted and repeatedly stabbed
both girls before he left.14 Concerned that no one had heard from her the
morning after the assault, JoAnn’s brother and boyfriend both set out to check
on her.15 Upon arriving at her apartment, the two men discovered the horrific
crime scene.16 That morning, Melissa told them the man who committed the
assaults had also worked on her mother’s car recently.17 She called him
“Bill.”18 She also told authorities the man drove a white Volkswagen.19
As investigators attempted to identify a suspect for the crimes, they
repeatedly asked Melissa for additional information about her assailant.20
Eventually, law enforcement created a composite drawing of a suspect based
on Melissa’s descriptions.21 A few of JoAnn’s relatives thought the composite
resembled one of JoAnn’s old romantic interests, Rodney Lincoln.22 A
detective met with both girls to view a photographic lineup and a live lineup
that included Lincoln.23 Both the lineups were conducted in a highly
suggestive manner using techniques that are considered unreliable today.24
The detective told the girls that he had a magic door the “bad man” was
12. J. Malcom Garcia, Reasonable Doubt, LATTERLY (March 29, 2018),
https://latterly.org/reasonable-doubt/ [perma.cc/FDF3-KLYM].
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11, 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); Affidavit
of Melissa DeBoer, MIDWEST INNOCENCE PROJECT, 3–4 (Nov. 30, 2015),
https://themip.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/M.D.-Letter-Requesting-Clemencyfor-Rodney-Lincoln-redacted.pdf [perma.cc/J39N-JJGC].
20. Affidavit of Melissa DeBoer, supra note 19, at 2–3.
21. Id.
22. Garcia, supra note 12.
23. Id.
24. See Eyewitness Identification: A Policy Review, THE JUST. PROJECT,
https://web.williams.edu/Psychology/Faculty/Kassin/files/Justice%20Project%20%20on%20ET.pdf [perma.cc/9FY8-NAFA]. “The Special Master also found that ‘[a]
witness’s age . . . bears on the reliability of an identification.’ A meta-analysis has
shown that children between the ages of nine and thirteen who view target-absent
lineups are more likely to make incorrect identifications than adults.” State v.
Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 906 (N.J. 2011).
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behind.25 He also told them the “bad man” was in one of the pictures and
emphasized that it was important to pick a photo so the “bad man” would not
go free.26 The photographic lineup contained only two photos: an outdated
mugshot of Mr. Lincoln and one of the girls’ relatives, who was another
person of interest.27 At only four years old, Renee would not look at the
photos.28 Seven-year-old Melissa picked Mr. Lincoln.29 Later the same day,
Melissa was presented with a live lineup of four individuals – Mr. Lincoln and
three men who looked remarkably unlike him.30 Mr. Lincoln was the shortest
in the lineup and was thinner than his co-suspects.31 His hair was short and
clean cut while the others had longer, shaggy haircuts.32 All of the men had
varying facial hair.33 Melissa identified Mr. Lincoln just as she had in the
photographic lineup.34
At trial, when Melissa was called to testify, she smiled at Mr. Lincoln
and even moved towards him on her way to the witness stand.35 This behavior
discredited the notion that Mr. Lincoln was the perpetrator of a violent assault
on the little girl and contributed in large part to a hung jury.36 Before the
retrial, prosecutors and social workers coached Melissa extensively on her

25. Garcia, supra note 12. Lineups should be completed in a double-blind
manner. Eyewitness Identification, supra note 24, at 7–8.
26. Affidavit of Melissa DeBoer, supra note 19, at 2.
27. Id. Photographic lineups should include at least 5 fillers and live lineups
should include at least 4 fillers. Eyewitness Identification, supra note 24, at 3.
Photographic lineups should also be presented sequentially. Id.
28. Id.
29. J. Malcom Garcia, Reasonable Doubt, LATTERLY (March 29, 2018),
https://latterly.org/reasonable-doubt/ [https://perma.cc/FDF3-KLYM].
30. Affidavit of Melissa DeBoer, supra note 19, at 3. Ms. DeBoer’s affidavit
contains a photo of the lineup. Id. at 4. Fillers should always resemble the witness’s
prior descriptions. Eyewitness Identification, supra note 24, at 3. Furthermore, the
suspects should all look as similar as possible so that no one suspect stands out.
Eyewitness Identification, supra note 24, at 3. The other three men looked remarkably
different from Mr. Lincoln. Affidavit of Melissa DeBoer, supra note 19, at 4. A vital
element of reliable lineup procedures requires that the witness be told the actual
perpetrator may not be in the lineup. Eyewitness Identification, supra note 24, at 3;
see also State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 913 (N.J. 2011).
31. Affidavit of Melissa DeBoer, supra note 19, at 4.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Affidavit of Melissa DeBoer, supra note 19, at 3. Viewing a suspect more
than once during an investigation can affect the reliability of the later identification.
State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 900 (N.J. 2011). “The problem, as the Special
Master found, is that successive views of the same person can make it difficult to know
whether the later identification stems from a memory of the original event or a
memory of the earlier identification procedure.” Id.
35. Garcia, supra note 12.
36. Id.
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testimony.37 Department of Family Service (“DFS”) records would later
reveal that following her attack, Melissa identified most men in her life as the
“bad man.”38 Melissa remembers that she was coached to stop saying her
attacker was “Bill” and to identify Mr. Lincoln instead.39 She received so
much coaching that Mr. Lincoln was the “bad man” that she now believes her
memory was altered.40
At the second trial, the substantive evidence against Mr. Lincoln
consisted of Melissa’s more polished eye witness identification and expert
testimony concerning a pubic hair found on a blanket in JoAnn’s room.41 The
expert testified that the hair “matched” Mr. Lincoln’s.42 While hair testimony
of this nature was once acceptable in a court proceeding, the “science” of hair
matching has been debunked so extensively that expert testimony concerning
hair “matches” is no longer admissible evidence at trials.43 At the close of the
second trial, the jury convicted Mr. Lincoln of manslaughter and two counts
of first-degree assault.44 He was sentenced to fifteen years on the
manslaughter count and life imprisonment on each assault count, with each
term to run consecutively.45

37. Rodney
Lincoln,
MIDWEST
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
https://themip.org/clients/rodney-lincoln/ [perma.cc/B6UT-X4HX] (last visited Dec.
15, 2019).
38. Petitioner’s Motion to Transfer at 5, In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d
11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (No. WD79854).
39. Letter from Melissa DeBoer to Jeremiah Nixon, Governor of Mo., &
Members of the Bd. of Prob. and Parole, (Dec. 5, 2016), https://themip.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/M.D.-Letter-Requesting-Clemency-for-Rodney-Lincolnredacted.pdf [perma.cc/J39N-JJGC].
40. Id.
41. In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11, 18 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
42. Id. at 15.
43. Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand Goals,
Tragic Flaws, and Judicial Gatekeeping, 44 JUDGES’ J. 16, 20–21 (2005). It is not
possible to say with any degree of scientific integrity that two sets of hairs came from
the same person. Id. at 20. Even findings that hairs are similar have a substantial rate
of error. Id. In fact, in 2015, the FBI formally acknowledged the problems with hair
matching, stating that twenty-six out of twenty-eight examiners overstated hair
findings ninety-five percent of the time over two decades. Spencer S. Hsu, After FBI
Admits Overstating Forensic Hair Matches, Focus Turns to Cases, WASH. POST (Apr.
20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/after-fbi-admits-overstatingforensic-hair-matches-focus-turns-to-cases/2015/04/20/a846aca8-e766-11e4-9a6ac1ab95a0600b_story.html. [perma.cc/DH78-CN89]. As a result, the FBI began
reviewing cases containing unfounded expert testimony concerning hair that
undoubtedly has contributed to a significant number of wrongful convictions. Id.
44. Lincoln, 517 S.W.3d at 15.
45. Id. Consecutive sentences mean the jail sentences run back to back rather
than at the same time (concurrently). Consecutive Sentence, LEG. INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/consecutive_sentence#. [perma.cc/98P5-TMBQ].
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On direct appeal to the Western District, Mr. Lincoln argued the trial
court abused its discretion when it found Melissa competent to testify.46 To
determine Melissa’s competency, the trial court applied a four-part test to
discern whether she possessed:
(1) [a] present understanding of or intelligence to understand, on
instructions, an obligation to speak the truth; (2) [the] mental capacity
at the time of the occurrence in question truly to observe and to register
such occurrence; (3) memory sufficient to retain an independent
recollection of the observations made; and (4) capacity truly to
translate into words the memory of such observation.47

Mr. Lincoln’s argument rested on the notion than an eight-year-old
(Melissa’s age at the time of trial) could not retain an independent recollection
of her observations of an incident.48 The Western District noted the trial court
correctly implemented the four-part test to determine Melissa’s competency
to testify.49 Because the trial court applied the correct test, the Western
District granted deference to the trial court’s finding without further
explanation.50 Mr. Lincoln’s conviction could not be disturbed, as the trial
court’s finding of competency was not an abuse of discretion.51
In 2012, thirty years after the original crime, Mr. Lincoln secured DNA
testing of the pubic hair identified as a “match” to him at trial.52 The DNA
tests proved conclusively that the hair did not belong to Mr. Lincoln.53
However, the court reviewing the DNA results (the “DNA court”) concluded
the pubic hair was not the “determinative factor” in Mr. Lincoln’s
conviction.54 Because the court viewed Melissa’s eyewitness testimony as the
linchpin in the convictions, it found the DNA test did not establish Mr.
Lincoln’s innocence.55 His request to be released was denied.56
In 2015, after viewing a Crime Watch Daily episode about her mother’s
murder and the assaults on her and her sister,57 Melissa recanted her

46. State v. Lincoln, 705 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). Mr. Lincoln
also argued that testimony of Renee’s behavior at the photo lineup was wrongly
admitted into evidence. Id. The appellate court found that this testimony was
cumulative and therefore not prejudicial to the defendant. Id. at 579.
47. Id. at 578 (citing Hildreth v. Key, 341 S.W.2d 601, 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Lincoln v. State, 457 S.W.3d 800, 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014).
53. Id. at 804.
54. Id. at 808.
55. Id. The finding of the motion court was affirmed on appeal. Id.
56. Id.
57. Rodney Lincoln Case: Crime Writer Challenges Decades-Old Conviction,
TRUE
CRIME
DAILY
(Nov.
23,
2015
10:39
AM),
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eyewitness identification of Mr. Lincoln.58 The documentary identified an
alternative perpetrator, a serial killer named Tommy Lynn Sells.59 Sells
claimed to have committed his first murder at age sixteen60 and went on to kill
over seventy more people across the country before he was finally caught in
Texas.61 At least four people, including Lincoln, were convicted and
subsequently released for murders that Sells committed.62 Sells’ pattern
consisted of breaking into a random house, typically around four a.m., and
using a knife from the kitchen to stab and assault his victims.63 Sells was in
St. Louis working for a relative who owned a Volkswagen repair shop near
Ms. Tate’s home at the time of her murder and the girls’ assaults.64 Melissa
says she recognized Sells as her true attacker when she saw him on the Crime
Watch Daily episode.65 Given her identification of Sells as her attacker,
Melissa began working diligently for Mr. Lincoln’s exoneration and release,
believing him to be innocent.66
After Melissa’s recantation, none of the evidence used to convict Mr.
Lincoln remained intact. It was now clear that Mr. Lincoln was, in fact,
innocent. Mr. Lincoln petitioned the state court for a writ of habeas corpus
asserting his innocence and claiming that he was denied a constitutionally

https://truecrimedaily.com/2015/11/23/does-dna-prove-wrong-man-behind-bars-indecades-old-murder/ [perma.cc/PSZ5-VY3G].
58. Garcia, supra note 12.
59. Rodney Lincoln Case, supra note 57; Garcia, supra note 12. Sells was
executed in Texas in 2014 for the murder of a thirteen-year-old girl. Garcia, supra
note 12. During this attack, Sells assaulted and stabbed the thirteen-year-old girl as
well as her ten-year-old friend, slashing both of their throats before leaving. Id. The
ten-year-old survived the attack. Id.
60. MICHAEL NEWTON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SERIAL KILLERS 235 (2d ed. 2006).
61. Id. at 237. Texas authorities announced on February 7, 2001 that they
believed Sells was responsible for approximately seventy murders across the United
States. Id.
62. See Julie Rea, BLUHM LEG. CLINIC: CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/il/jul
ie-rea.html [perma.cc/PM6B-2XVG] (last visited Dec. 16, 2019); Jennifer S. Mann,
Victim Recants ID That Put Man in Prison for Mother’s Murder in St. Louis in 1982,
ST.
LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH
(Dec.
1,
2015),
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/victim-recants-id-that-putman-in-prison-for-mother/article_503a9500-b913-5a2f-b655-ff822f62f917.html
[perma.cc/GXN7-DT4D]. Because his crimes lasted decades and spanned the
country, there are bound to be more innocent individuals serving time for Sells’
crimes.
63. Rodney Lincoln Case, supra note 57; Mann, supra note 62.
64. Rodney Lincoln Case, supra note 57.
65. Letter from Melissa DeBoer to Jeremiah Nixon, supra note 39; see also
Rodney Lincoln Case, supra note 57.
66. Garcia, supra note 12.
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adequate trial.67 The trial court denied his petition.68 Mr. Lincoln then
petitioned the Western District for a writ of habeas corpus on the same
grounds.69 The court first addressed Mr. Lincoln’s alleged constitutional
violations.70 Finding none, the court denied all claims depending on a
constitutional violation to prevail.71 Mr. Lincoln’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus would have to rest on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.72 Even
though none of the evidence used to convict Mr. Lincoln remained, the court
denied his freestanding claim of actual innocence on a procedural technicality
– a freestanding claim is exclusively reserved for defendants facing a death
sentence.73 Even when an incarcerated defendant not on death row illustrates
a compelling case of actual innocence, innocence alone is insufficient to grant
a writ of habeas corpus.74

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The general purpose of habeas corpus is to give detainees of a
government the right to challenge their detention as unlawful in court.75
Habeas corpus has been a foundational principle of criminal justice since the
Magna Carta was signed in 1215.76 At the United States’ inception, the
Founders drafted the Suspension Clause into the Constitution which states,
“The Privileges of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unless
when in Cases of Rebellion of Invasion the public Safety may require it.”77
While the Suspension Clause prevents suspension of habeas corpus rights, it
does not create an individual right to habeas corpus relief.78 Federal and state
statutes create the right for citizens to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.79
Because the right to habeas corpus derives from distinct sources at the state
and federal level, the right varies from state to state as well as from state to
federal courts.80 In the case of criminal convictions, courts granting habeas

67. In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11, 16–18 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). He
alleged three constitutional violations: Brady violations, ineffective assistance of
counsel, and a violation of due process. Id. at 17–18.
68. Id. at 16.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 17.
71. Id. at 18.
72. Id. at 15–16.
73. Id. at 20–24.
74. Id. at 23.
75. Habeas Corpus, supra note 8.
76. Id.
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
78. Habeas Corpus, supra note 8.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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relief vacate the conviction of the petitioning defendant.81 Because the
conviction is vacated, defendants are released from custody.82
In Missouri, the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted
by Missouri Supreme Court Rule 91.01(b), which states, “Any person
restrained of liberty within this state may petition for a writ of habeas corpus
to inquire into the cause of such restraint.”83 The Missouri Constitution
delineates an unqualified suspension clause, which states, “[T]he privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended.”84 Missouri’s common
law provides three avenues for habeas relief: (1) on the basis of a jurisdictional
issue, (2) upon demonstration of “cause and prejudice,” or (3) when a
“manifest injustice” would result unless habeas relief is granted.85 The
“manifest injustice” prong is grounded in the notion that the continued
detention of a citizen would be a manifest injustice when a constitutional
violation contributed to the detention.86
Prior to State ex rel Amrine v. Roper, Missouri jurisprudence provided
only for “gateway” claims to permit review of alleged constitutional
violations under the “cause and prejudice” and “manifest injustice” prongs of
habeas corpus.87 A “gateway” entitles a petitioner to “review on the merits of
. . . otherwise defaulted constitutional claim[s].”88 Without proof of a
qualifying gateway, even a meritorious constitutional violation is insufficient
to constitute a manifest injustice warranting habeas relief.89 So, in order to
establish the right to habeas relief, the petitioner must demonstrate both the
gateway itself as well as a constitutional violation – neither alone provide a
path to habeas relief.
There are two “gateways” that permit a court to consider the underlying
constitutional violation: (1) “actual innocence” under the manifest injustice
prong and (2) the “cause and prejudice” prong itself.90 If a defendant can
demonstrate his innocence, the gateway is opened for the court to review
alleged constitutional violations that occurred at trial.91 The burden pertaining
to innocence does not require the negation of all evidence that supported the
conviction at trial. 92 Instead, the defendant must show “it is more likely than

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. MO. SUP. CT. R. 91.01(b)
84. MO. CONST. art. I, § 12.
85. In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11, 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016), transfer
denied, (citing State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Mo. 2003) (en
banc)).
86. Id. at 16–17.
87. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
88. Lincoln, 517 S.W.3d at 17 (quoting State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102
S.W.3d 541, 546 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)).
89. Id. (citing Clay v. Dormire, 37 S.W.3d 214, 217 (Mo. 2000) (en banc)).
90. Id. at 16–17.
91. Id. at 17.
92. Id.
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not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the defendant.”93 The
“actual innocence” gateway is based on the premise that it would be a manifest
injustice not to review the constitutionality of a trial if the defendant is
innocent. 94 The gateway of “cause and prejudice” requires both a valid cause
for failing to raise an issue in a timely manner and a showing of prejudice as
a result of that failure.95 In other words, if the defendant can show that he or
she was not responsible for missing the original habeas corpus deadline but
his or her claims of constitutional violations are valid, the gateway is open for
the court to review those claims. 96 Because gateway claims require both the
presence of the gateway and a constitutional violation, defendants who are
able to establish their innocence but not a constitutional violation at trial do
not qualify for habeas relief.
The Supreme Court of Missouri first recognized a freestanding claim for
habeas relief when it decided Amrine.97 In 2003, Joseph Amrine’s execution
date was already set when the Supreme Court of Missouri requested a hearing
concerning Mr. Amrine’s motion for a stay of execution.98 Mr. Amrine’s trial
did not contain constitutional deficiencies that contributed to his
incarceration.99 Rather, Mr. Amrine was convicted based on the testimony of
three jailhouse informants, all of whom later recanted their testimony and
cited compelling reasons for their original perjury.100 Two additional facts
reinforced Mr. Amrine’s innocence: (1) no physical evidence tied Mr. Amrine
to the crime, and (2) circumstantial evidence showed Mr. Amrine could not
possibly have committed the murder.101 The problem for Mr. Amrine was
that no judicial procedure existed for him to establish his innocence in court
and secure his freedom.102 Because he could not show a constitutional
violation adversely affected his trial, habeas relief was unavailable to Mr.
Amrine.103
The Supreme Court of Missouri responded to considerable political
pressure by scheduling a hearing in Mr. Amrine’s case.104 In its subsequent
opinion, the court expanded habeas corpus relief to include a freestanding

93. Id. (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 332 (1995) (Connor, J.,
concurring)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Mo. 2003)
98. Alexandra Gross, Joseph Amrine, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Jul.
23, 2015), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?ca
seid=2993 [perma.cc/4ZSH-F3UW].
99. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 545–46.
100. Id. at 544–45.
101. Id. at 548–49.
102. Id. at 547.
103. Id. at 546–47.
104. Gross, supra note 98.
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claim of actual innocence.105 The court recognized the urgency the execution
of an innocent person warrants saying, “[I]t is incumbent upon the courts of
this state to provide judicial recourse to an individual who . . . is able to
produce sufficient evidence of innocence to undermine . . . confidence in the
underlying judgment that resulted in defendant’s conviction and sentence of
death.”106 The court emphasized the execution of an innocent person would
be a manifest injustice and reversed Mr. Amrine’s conviction.107 The court
delineated that a freestanding claim of actual innocence dispenses with the
two-step “gateway” and “constitutional violation” analysis and declares that
innocence itself is enough to show that continued detention would be a
manifest injustice warranting habeas relief.108 Innocence is established when
no credible evidence remains to support the original conviction.109 In Lincoln,
however, the Western District held that the freestanding claim of actual
innocence is only available when the petitioner has been sentenced to death.110
In non-death penalty cases, innocence is limited to serving as a gateway to
review of otherwise procedurally barred claims of constitutional violations at
trial.111 Even though an incarcerated person may have demonstrated his actual
innocence, his continued detention is not legally considered a manifest
injustice warranting habeas relief on its own.112

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In his petition to the Western District, Mr. Lincoln argued three distinct
grounds for habeas corpus relief: (1) a gateway claim of actual innocence, (2)
a gateway claim of “cause and prejudice,” and (3) a freestanding claim of
actual innocence.113 To support his claim of innocence, Mr. Lincoln
emphasized that no evidence remained to support his conviction.114 At trial,
the two pieces of substantive evidence used to convict Mr. Lincoln consisted
of the pubic hair “match” and Melissa’s eyewitness identification.115 Because
DNA evidence conclusively rebutted the hair “match” and Melissa recanted
her testimony, none of the evidence used to convict Mr. Lincoln remained.
The lack of evidence against him combined with affirmative evidence of his
105. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 547.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 547–49. Before Mr. Amrine could be released, the prosecutor insisted
on testing “blood” evidence that it previously claimed had been destroyed. See Amrine
v. State, 785 S.W.2d 531, 535 (Mo. 1990) (en banc). The DNA tests came back
negative altogether – the substance wasn’t blood at all. It was paint.
108. Id. at 546–47.
109. Id. at 548–49.
110. In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
111. Id. at 20–23.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 16.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 15.
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innocence116 was more than sufficient to support Mr. Lincoln’s assertion of
actual innocence.
Mr. Lincoln argued three separate constitutional violations occurred at
his trial.117 Mr. Lincoln alleged Brady violations,118 in particular suppression
of the DFS records concerning Melissa’s uncertainty in her identification of
Mr. Lincoln and detailing extensive coaching of Melissa prior to her
testimony at trial.119 He alleged a constitutional violation via ineffective
assistance of counsel stemming from failure to fully impeach Melissa’s trial
testimony and failure to acquire the DFS records.120 He also argued the faulty
forensic evidence based on the hair “match” constituted a due process
violation.121 The court was not convinced by any of these claims.
To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show the prosecution
suppressed favorable evidence resulting in prejudice to the defendant.122
While the information in question was undoubtedly favorable to Mr. Lincoln’s
case, the suppression and prejudice elements were disputed.123 The court
found the alleged Brady material to be cumulative of information already
available to the defense, specifically that Melissa originally identified her
assailant as “Bill.”124 The court also found that Melissa was extensively crossexamined concerning the inconsistency of her identification.125 Because Mr.
Lincoln already knew and used the information at trial, the court reasoned he
could not have been prejudiced by suppression of the DFS records.126 On both
the alleged Brady violation and the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
the court found no constitutional violations.127
The court also held Mr. Lincoln did not meet his burden to establish a
due process violation as a result of faulty forensic evidence, citing the DNA
court’s finding that the hair “match” was not the linchpin of his conviction.128
Without a constitutional violation, both of Mr. Lincoln’s gateway claims for

116. Mr. Lincoln had a solid alibi verifiable by many witnesses. Garcia, supra note
12.
117. Lincoln, 517 S.W.3d at 17–18.
118. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
119. Lincoln, 517 S.W.3d at 17–18.
120. Id. at 18.
121. Id. at 17.
122. Id. at 18. Favorable evidence can be either exculpatory or impeachment
evidence. Id. Suppression need not be willful. Id. Prejudice requires a showing that
suppression of the favorable evidence undermines the validity of the verdict. Id. at 19
(quoting State ex rel. Woodworth v. Denney, 396 S.W.3d 330, 338 (Mo. 2013) (en
banc)).
123. Id. at 19.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 19–20.
128. Id. at 18.
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habeas corpus relief failed.129 His only remaining argument was the
freestanding claim of actual innocence, which does not require a constitutional
violation but instead rests on the premise that it is a manifest injustice to
continue incarcerating a person who has demonstrated his innocence.130
In denying Mr. Lincoln’s petition for habeas relief, the Lincoln court
completed an extensive evaluation of Amrine.131 The court noted that Amrine
emphasized the manifest injustice that would occur if the state executed an
innocent person.132 However, Amrine did not address whether it is a manifest
injustice to merely incarcerate an innocent person for life.133 Amrine also
failed to address whether either punishment, e.g., execution or incarceration
of an innocent person, would violate the Missouri Constitution.134 As a result,
the Lincoln court determined that whether or not a due process violation
occurs when an innocent is executed or incarcerated is unresolved altogether:
“It thus remains an open and unanswered question whether either the
continued incarceration or execution of a person who clearly and convincingly
establishes his actual innocence after a constitutionally adequate trial violates
due process, warranting habeas relief . . . .”135 Because these questions went
unaddressed in Amrine, the Lincoln court found that the freestanding claim of
actual innocence established by Amrine was limited to capital cases stating,
“Amrine cannot be read . . . to have broadly recognized a freestanding claim
of actual innocence in non-death penalty cases.”136
Applying the law as established by Amrine, the court denied Lincoln’s
freestanding claim for habeas relief.137 Habeas corpus relief is available when
the detention in question amounts to a violation of the constitution or laws of
the state or federal government.138 The court noted that Mr. Lincoln’s
incarceration as a person having demonstrated actual innocence did not
violate a current state or federal statute because no law prohibits the continued
incarceration of an innocent if he was convicted at a trial void of constitutional
violations.139 Without a written law explicitly prohibiting his continued
detention, the only remaining, possibly viable argument was Mr. Lincoln’s
assertion that his incarceration constituted a due process violation.140 The
court’s narrow construction of Amrine as having left unanswered whether
incarceration or even execution of an innocent person is a due process

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 20–23.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. (emphasis excluded).
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 23.
Id.
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violation was dispositive of Mr. Lincoln’s argument.141 According to the
court, the Supreme Court of Missouri has not determined the incarceration of
an innocent is a due process violation, and therefore the court could not find
that Mr. Lincoln’s incarceration was a violation of due process either.142
While recognizing the strength of Mr. Lincoln’s claim of innocence, the court
stated it did not have the authority to extend the application of Amrine to noncapital cases: “In short, no matter how compelling [Lincoln’s] argument may
be, we are constrained to afford habeas relief only as authorized.”143
In a footnote, the court advised that Mr. Lincoln could seek clemency
from the governor as a remedy for his incarceration as an innocent person
– that is, petition the governor for a pardon or commutation of his sentence.144
Citing Herrera v. Collins,145 it recognized executive clemency as the
traditional remedy when new evidence is discovered too late for relief through
the courts.146 The court seemingly accepted that Mr. Lincoln was innocent
but took a limited view of Amrine, refusing to grant relief to an innocent
person in a non-death penalty case. The court ultimately found Amrine did
not establish precedent from the Supreme Court of Missouri that incarceration
of an innocent person is either a manifest injustice or a constitutional due
process violation.147

V. COMMENT
Time and again, the Supreme Court of Missouri has lauded that
“[h]abeas corpus is the last judicial inquiry into the validity of a criminal
conviction[,]”148 and it serves as “a bulwark against convictions that violate
141. Id. at 22.
142. Id. at 23.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 24 n.12.
145. 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993).
146. Lincoln, 517 S.W.3d at 24 n.12.
147. Id. at 23. The Supreme Court of Missouri denied Mr. Lincoln’s request for
transfers. In 2018, Governor Greitens commuted Mr. Lincoln’s sentence to time
served. Rachel Rice, A Week of Freedom: Rodney Lincoln, His Murder Sentence
Commuted, Adjusts to Lie After 36 Years Behind Bars, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
(Jun. 13, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/a-week-offreedom-rodney-lincoln-his-murder-sentence-commuted/article_cde8c8d7-90a95053-a0bc-27e0536377ff.html [perma.cc/C5B8-NYF0].
Greitens released a
statement saying, “Rodney Lincoln was wrongly convicted of capital murder and has
served 34 years in prison for a crime he did not commit. DNA evidence and one
eyewitness were used to convict him. Now, we know the DNA evidence was wrong
and the eyewitness – the daughter of the victim – says he is innocent and wants him
to be free.” Joe Millitzer, Gov. Greitens Announces Pardons and Clemency Decisions
NOW:
ST.
LOUIS
(Jun.
1,
2018),
Before
Resignation,
FOX2
https://fox2now.com/2018/06/01/gov-greitens-announces-pardons-and-clemencydecisions-before-resignation/ [perma.cc/N6F6JA24].
148. State ex rel. Carr v. Wallace, 527 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Mo. 2017) (en banc).
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fundamental fairness.”149 The “bulwark against . . . fundamental fairness”
language originated with the Supreme Court of the United States,150 where the
concept of fundamental fairness has a robust history.151 Fundamental fairness
incorporates protections into due process, even when they are not explicitly
stated in the text.152 “The standard query in such cases is whether the
challenged practice or policy violates ‘a fundamental principle of liberty and
justice which inheres in the very idea of a free government and is the
inalienable right of a citizen of such government.’”153 The requirement that
the prosecution prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt is one such
requirement created under the doctrine of fundamental fairness.154 Under the
umbrella of fundamental fairness, the Supreme Court of the United States has
extended the protection of due process to remedy unfair sentencing schemes,
faulty jury instructions, and rules that keep a defendant from wearing nonprison clothing in front of a jury.155 All of these causes are worthy of the
attention and protection they have received, but their holdings beg the
question: if due process can protect a defendant from wearing prison orange
in front of a jury, how does it not protect an innocent person from a life
sentence? According to both the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Missouri, finality is the reason for limiting habeas corpus
so stringently, and executive clemency alone is the remedy for innocent
persons who find no relief in the courts.156

A. Finality is an Inadequate Justification
Courts often describe the government’s interest in finality as vital to the
integrity of the judicial system.157 Finality contributes to efficiency in the
court system, enhances the quality of judicial rulings, and preserves the
balance between state and federal power.158 Finality is also said to increase
149. State ex rel. Woodworth v. Denney, 396 S.W.3d 330, 337 (Mo. 2013) (en
banc); see also State ex rel. Clemons v. Larkins, 475 S.W.3d 60, 76 (Mo. 2015) (en
banc); State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
150. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 443
U.S. 72, 97 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (internal quotations omitted).
151. See generally, The Principle of Fundamental Fairness, LEG. INFO. INST.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/section-1/generallythe-principle-of-fundamental-fairness#fn1080amd14 [perma.cc/93AB-LV46] (last
visited Dec. 17, 2019).
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908)).
154. Id. at n.1078.
155. Id.
156. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993); In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517
S.W.3d 11, 23 (2016).
157. Todd E. Pettys, Killing Roger Coleman: Habeas, Finality, and the Innocence
Gap, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2313, 2336 (2007).
158. Ellyde Roko, Finality, Habeas, Innocence, and the Death Penalty: Can
Justice Be Done?, 85 WASH. L. REV. 107, 121 (2010).
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public confidence in court outcomes.159 The interest in finality is so
paramount to other interests that when a court speaks of finality as relevant to
the case at hand, the party seeking to disrupt the judgment almost always
loses.160 Finality has also been used with increasing frequency as a
justification for limiting review of criminal judgements.161 The result is that
finality trumps fairness where habeas is concerned.162 Not only has fairness
been forced to submit to the interest of finality, the volume of precedent
extolling finality has overwhelmed the reality of other public and private
interests that oppose it.
Multiple significant interests of the private individual, the public, and
the government weigh against the government’s interest in finality. The
government’s interests in the integrity of the judicial system and the public
perception of that integrity are both put at risk when an innocent is denied a
remedy. When the plight of an incarcerated innocent reaches the public, word
spreads through the news and social media as advocacy grows for the one
wrongfully convicted. Skepticism of the system increases when court
procedure creates barriers to commonsense justice. Finality as an objective,
legal fact is not intuitive or even logical to the public, especially when an
innocent is facing severe punishment.163 As a practical matter, “[F]inality is
exceptionally difficult to achieve in the face of reasonable suspicions of
innocence,”164 and even more difficult to achieve in the face of indisputable
evidence of innocence. Habeas corpus procedure that does not account for
the public’s understandable response to the plight of an innocent is poorly
calculated to protect the public and government interest in the integrity of the
judicial and criminal justice systems.165
Not only is there strong government and public interest in disturbing a
final judgment when it has been proven to be seriously flawed, there are
compelling private interests in justice and liberty weighing against finality as
well. The Supreme Court of the United States has acknowledged that liberty
is one of the strongest private interests granted by the Constitution.166 This
interest governs common law concerning pre-trial detention and postconviction sentencing.167 Suddenly, this interest is forgotten when an
innocent person challenges his conviction without an additional, distinct
constitutional violation.168 The Supreme Court of the United States has also
159. Pettys, supra note 157, at 2336–37.
160. Id. at 2341.
161. Roko, supra note 158, at 113.
162. Id.
163. Pettys, supra note 157, at 2341–42.
164. Id. at 2343.
165. Id. at 2352.
166. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 US. 833, 848 (1992);
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
167. See, e.g., Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
168. Pettys, supra note 157, at 2341–42.
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instructed that the duty of a prosecutor, and impliedly the purpose of the
criminal justice system, is not in acquiring convictions but rather in finding
truth and justice.169 This interest is also forgotten when it comes to challenges
of debunked convictions.170
Private interests in liberty and justice are compounded when the
disparity between innocents who acquire justice and those who do not is
governed solely by procedure. What difference is there between an innocent
whose conviction was obtained through a trial free from constitutional
violations and an innocent who was convicted at a trial containing prejudicial
constitutional violations? What difference is there between an innocent
sentenced to death and an innocent sentenced to die in prison via a life
sentence without the possibility of parole? The only real differences among
them are based in legal procedure. All innocent people deserve justice from
their government and the liberty afforded by the Constitution. No innocent
deserves the degradation of their humanity resulting from incarceration or
execution. Yet, legal procedure only offers relief to some innocents while
leaving others without remedy. Legal procedures serve an important function
in both the criminal justice and civil systems, but procedure should not be a
barrier to justice. When it is, the Constitution and the values fundamental to
liberty and democracy demand a remedy.
Given the strong government and public interests in the integrity of the
judicial and criminal justice systems, as well as the private interests in liberty
and justice, it is baffling that the interest in finality wins the day in the face of
overwhelming evidence of innocence. The emergence of DNA testing in
forensic science has forced us to confront the fact that even fair trials
sometimes produce very wrong results. We now know that wrongful
convictions are much more common than anyone would have guessed just
thirty years ago.171 This is true even when there is a lack of physical evidence
to produce a DNA exoneration.172 While finality might demand a high barrier
to overturning a result produced by a seemingly fair trial, if the defendant can
overcome that high hurdle and demonstrate convincingly, as in this case, that
he is actually innocent, finality must yield to truth.

B. Clemency is an Ineffective and Unreliable Remedy
Both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
Missouri have suggested that executive clemency is the remedy for an

169. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
170. Pettys, supra note 157, at 2327–28.
171. As of October 31, 2019, The National Registry of Exonerations has recorded
2,509 exonerations since the first DNA exoneration in 1989. Exonerations by Year:
DNA
and
Non-DNA,
NAT’L
REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx
[perma.cc/5BAH-CNR7] [hereinafter Exonerations by Year] (last visited Dec. 17,
2019).
172. Id.
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innocent person who finds no remedy in the courts.173 Yet, multiple problems
prevent clemency from serving as an effective remedy for incarcerated
innocents – problems that are the natural result of a system never intended to
handle innocence claims.174 The power of clemency has been and continues
to be a function of political expediency rather than an accessible or significant
remedy for those suffering an injustice.175 Executives grant clemency most
often during their final days in office – when political consequences have
evaporated and they no longer risk the accountability power of constituents at
the polls.176 As such, executives have not focused their clemency power on
remedying wrongful convictions through any strategic or structured system.177
It is naïve to believe that a power so political can be trusted to reliably
guarantee justice.
In addition to this, the procedures necessary to acquire clemency are
riddled with obstacles including a lack of transparency, biased boards
administering the procedures, and the absence of motivation or incentive to
address the injustice of wrongful convictions.178 Defendants who apply for
clemency are afforded little constitutional protection in the application
process.179 Such protection, if available at all, typically focuses on access to
the application process rather than substantive standards of due process
throughout application procedures, and courts have proven reluctant to
interfere with even the “most troublesome” clemency procedures.180 So,
while the courts continue to laud clemency as a remedy for wrongful
convictions, clemency procedures have not been adapted or reformed to
become an effective corrective justice function.181
Clemency generally has not been an effective remedy for innocents, and
that story is no different in Missouri. The Missouri governor’s clemency
power is derived from Missouri Constitution Article IV Section Seven which
states, “The governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of
impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations
as he may deem proper, subject to provisions of law as to the manner of
applying for pardons.”182 Missouri’s clemency procedures are saturated with

173. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993); In re Lincoln v. Cassady,
517 S.W.3d 11, 24 (2016).
174. Sarah Lucy Cooper, The State Clemency Power and Innocence Claims: The
Influence of Finality and its Implications for Innocents, 7 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 51,
107–08 (2015).
175. Id.; Sarah Lucy Cooper & Daniel Gough, The Controversy of Clemency and
Innocence in America, 51 CAL. WESTERN L. REV. 55, 72 (2014).
176. See Cooper, supra note 174, at 92–93.
177. Cooper & Gough, supra note 175, at 109.
178. Cooper, supra note 174, at 107–08.
179. Cooper & Gough, supra note 175, at 109–10.
180. Id.
181. Cooper, supra note 174, at 108.
182. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
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the same problems outlined above. First, Missouri’s clemency is limited in
several ways. For example, a person who has been denied executive clemency
within the past three years is barred from submitting a clemency application
again.183 A clemency board within the Department of Corrections investigates
clemency applications and forms recommendations, which are relayed to the
governor.184 This process is neither free from bias nor entirely transparent.
The governor also retains full discretion concerning to whom and when he
will grant executive clemency, perpetuating the political expediency that
prevents clemency from being a reliable remedy to wrongful convictions.185
Not only is clemency difficult to acquire through the unpredictable and
biased process, clemency is an imperfect solution even when it is granted.
After losing in the courts, Mr. Lincoln turned his attention and efforts to
clemency. Mr. Lincoln was denied clemency by Governor Nixon.186
Fortunately for Mr. Lincoln, while mired in scandal, Missouri’s fifty-sixth
Governor left office after only sixteen months.187 On his final day in office,
Governor Greitens commuted Mr. Lincoln’s sentence to time served.188 Mr.
Lincoln spent nearly two additional years in prison after the Western District
denied his habeas corpus claim before he was finally granted relief.189 If
Governor Greitens had not been relieved of the political pressure to appeal to
his constituents as a result of political scandal, Mr. Lincoln might still be
incarcerated.
In his statement announcing several pardons and commutations,
Greitens cited Mr. Lincoln’s innocence as the reason for the commutation,
stating that Mr. Lincoln was wrongfully convicted.190 If Mr. Lincoln had been
granted habeas corpus relief, his conviction would have been reversed.191
However, because Governor Greitens merely commuted Mr. Lincoln’s
sentence, he has not been legally exonerated for the heinous crimes.192 His
conviction still stands and appears on his criminal record.193 Because the
conviction still stands, so do all of the collateral consequences of a felony

183. MO. BD. OF PROBATION & PAROLE, The Executive Clemency Process in
Missouri, MO. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, https://doc.mo.gov/sites/doc/files/201801/Clemency_Brochure.pdf [perma.cc/E4FX-3Z69] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Rodney Lincoln, supra note 37.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. The Western District issued its ruling denying Mr. Lincoln’s habeas corpus
petition on October 11, 2016. Governor Greitens commuted Mr. Lincoln’s sentence
on June 1, 2018.
190. Millitzer, supra note 147.
191. The state could still choose to re-prosecute him. After thirty-four years and
a total lack of evidence, it’s unlikely the state would take that route and even more
unlikely he would be convicted if the state did re-prosecute.
192. See supra note 190.
193. Rodney Lincoln, supra note 37.
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record.194 He is also ineligible for any sort of compensation for his wrongful
conviction.195 A commutation does not come close to restoring a person to
the position they were in prior to conviction by the mere fact that it does not
reverse or expunge the conviction from the innocent’s record, let alone its
failure to address the physical, mental, and emotional toll a wrongful
conviction and incarceration exacts on an innocent, his loved ones, and his
community.

C. Real Remedies for the Constitutional Paradox
The Lincoln court believed its hands were tied regarding the justice it
could provide Mr. Lincoln, but were its options really so limited? The court
read Amrine in a very narrow manner, finding that the freestanding claim of
actual innocence was available only for those facing the death penalty.196 But
Amrine could just as easily have been read more broadly. Amrine extolled the
virtues of habeas corpus as a stop gap to detentions that violate fundamental
fairness.197 The opening paragraph to the majority opinion in Amrine states:
Because the continued imprisonment and eventual execution of an
innocent person is a manifest injustice, a habeas petitioner under a
sentence of death may obtain relief from a judgment of conviction and
sentence of death upon a clear and convincing showing of actual
innocence that undermines confidence in the correctness of the
judgment.198

Given the opening clause to this holding sentence, it is illogical and arbitrary
to assert that even though continued imprisonment of an innocent person is a
manifest injustice, habeas relief is available only to those sentenced to death.
Furthermore, when the Amrine court addressed the insufficiency of
preexisting remedies warranting the expansion of habeas relief to freestanding
claims of actual innocence, it noted precedent failed to account for compelling
cases of actual innocence independent of constitutional violations at trial.199
The court said this failure was “all the more true” in death penalty cases but
not exclusive to death penalty cases.200 As Judge Michael A. Wolff stated in
his concurring opinion to Amrine, “Both the principal opinion and the dissents
194. See generally Colleen F. Shanahan, Significant Entanglement: A Framework
for the Civil Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387
(2012).
195. See, e.g., Ariel Rothfield, Missouri Man Freed from Prison May Not Receive
Any Compensation, KSHB 41 (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.kshb.com/news/localnews/missouri-man-freed-from-prison-may-not-receive-any-compensation
[perma.cc/87R6-HANX].
196. In re Lincoln v. Cassady, 517 S.W.3d 11, 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
197. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
198. Id. (emphasis added)
199. Id. at 547.
200. Id.
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recognize that the state court’s writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy
in cases of actual innocence.”201 The concurring and dissenting judges in
Amrine did not disagree with the majority opinion concerning the availability
of habeas corpus for the actually innocent but rather on the form and extent of
the remedy and on factual issues in Mr. Amrine’s case.202 When all of the
Amrine opinions are read thoroughly, they convey an obvious message: the
Supreme Court of Missouri believes continued detention of innocents is a
manifest injustice for which there should be a state court remedy.
Special Master for the Supreme Court of Missouri, Darrel E. Missey,
recently weighed in on the Western District’s opinion.203 The Supreme Court
appointed Judge Missey to evaluate a habeas corpus petition that included a
freestanding claim of actual innocence for a defendant not on death row.204 In
his report to the court, Judge Missey carefully detailed his interpretation of
Amrine and its applicability to non-death penalty defendants.205 In the end,
Judge Missey respectfully disagreed with the Lincoln court:
There is no reasonable argument that an innocent petitioner’s
incarceration for life does not qualify as a ‘manifest injustice.’ Only
the most tortured logic could yield the conclusion that [a non-death
penalty defendant] must continue to serve a life sentence but would
[walk] free if only he had been sentenced to death. There is no basis
in law or reason for such a distinction to be made.206

Judge Missey concluded that the petitioning defendant should be eligible
for a freestanding claim of actual innocence.207 He also found that
constitutional violations at the defendant’s trial qualified him for gateway
claims.208 The Supreme Court agreed with Judge Missey that constitutional
violations established a gateway claim for habeas relief and ruled solely on
these grounds.209 As a result, the court did not adopt or address Judge
Missey’s recommendation for the availability of the freestanding claim for
non-death penalty defendants.210
201. Id. at 549 (Wolff, J., concurring).
202. E.g., whether to order a new trial, appoint a special master, or order Mr.
Amrine be released. Id. at 549–52 (Wolff, J., concurring; Benton, J., and Price, J.,
dissenting).
203. See Master’s Report to the Supreme Court of Missouri and Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, In re Robinson v. Cassady (2018) (No. SC95892).
204. Id. at 3.
205. Id. at 73–74.
206. Id. at 74.
207. Id. at 90.
208. Id.
209. See Kathy Sweeney, Sikeston, MO Man Released, Charges Dismissed Nearly
18 Years After Murder Conviction, KFVS.COM (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://www.kfvs12.com/story/38087260/sikeston-mo-man-released-chargesdismissed-nearly-18-years-after-murder-conviction/ [perma.cc/22ZA-UGB2].
210. Id.
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In addition to the language of the Supreme Court of Missouri is Supreme
Court of the United States precedent regarding fundamental fairness.
Remember, fundamental fairness is violated when jury instructions are faulty
and when a defendant is forced to wear prison garb in front of the jury.211 The
Lincoln court could have employed this broader view of fundamental fairness,
relative to the incarceration of an innocent person, to reach the commonsense
conclusion that it is in fact a violation of fundamental fairness and as such, a
violation of due process to continue to detain an innocent person. The only
risk of so holding would have been that the Supreme Court of Missouri
accepted transfer and reversed.212 The overwhelming benefit would have
been filling a significant gap in legal procedure that is a barrier to justice for
innocents. While the Lincoln court failed to fill this gap, it continues to be an
option available to state courts in Missouri.
Not only is this remedy available to Missouri courts, at least seven states
permit review of freestanding claims of actual innocence for all defendants as
a matter of common law precedent.213 Connecticut, Texas, Illinois, Florida,
and South Dakota have all extended the freestanding claim of actual
innocence to capital and non-capital defendants alike, holding that it would be
a constitutional violation of due process to deny a procedural avenue for
innocents to challenge their incarceration or execution.214 The Supreme Court
of Connecticut held extension of habeas relief to freestanding claims was
required to bring habeas corpus procedures in line with the demands of law
and justice.215 The Supreme Court of Connecticut went on to say that even
the interest in finality is not a strong enough government interest to defeat a
claim of actual innocence because the continued incarceration of innocents

211. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
212. In a law review article following Amrine’s decision, Missouri Supreme Court
Judge Laura Denvir Stith argued that states are not beholden to follow federal habeas
corpus precedent. Honorable Laura Denvir Stith, A Contrast of State and Federal
Court Authority to Grant Habeas Relief, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 432 (2004). She
made the case that state courts are free to broaden habeas relief to freestanding claims
of actual innocence. Id. She recognized that Missouri created the freestanding claim
for capital defendants, but she did not address why it has not applied more broadly to
any defendant that can demonstrate innocence. Id. “[O]ur prior cases have recognized
that habeas corpus relief is available to prevent manifest injustice. . . . Amrine then
stated, ‘It is difficult to imagine a more manifestly unjust and unconstitutional result
than permitting the execution of an innocent person.’” Id.
213. See John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts’ Approaches
to a Constitutional Right of Actual Innocence: Is There a Need for a State
Constitutional Right in the New York in the Aftermath of CPL § 440.10(1)(G-1)?, 76
ALB. L. REV. 1453, 1471–81 (2013).
214. Engesser v. Young, 856 N.W.2d 471, 481–82 (2014); People v. Washington,
665 N.E.2d 1330, 1337 (Ill. 1996); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996) (en banc); Summerville v. Warden, State Prison, 641 A.2d 1356,
1368 (Conn. 1994); Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991).
215. Summerville, 641 A.2d at 1369.
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would be a fundamental miscarriage of justice demanding a remedy.216 The
Supreme Court of Illinois has held that remedies should be available under
habeas corpus as a matter of due process, regardless of the punishment
imposed.217
The Supreme Court of Texas found that any punishment would implicate
federal constitutional violations for innocents saying, “We think it clear . . .
the incarceration of an innocent person is as much a violation of the Due
Process Clause as is the execution of such a person. . . . In either case, such
claims raise issues of federal constitutional magnitude.”218 The Supreme
Court of Texas arrived at this conclusion by reading the dicta of Herrera v.
Collins closely and concluding that all nine justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States (five in the majority and four in the dissent) believe the
difference in sentence should not change the avenues of relief.219 Both the
justices who joined the majority opinion and those who joined the dissenting
opinion of Herrera endorsed comments in those opinions that argue treating
defendants differently based on the sentence imposed would be
nonsensical.220 The Supreme Court of Texas latched on to this dicta to justify
its expansion of habeas corpus relief to all innocents regardless of their
sentence.221
Iowa and New Mexico have both adopted the freestanding claim of
actual innocence, even though the death penalty is not imposed in their
states.222 The Supreme Court of Iowa did not mince words when it recognized
the freestanding claim of actual innocence stating, “What kind of system of
justice do we have if we permit actually innocent people to remain in prison?
. . . It is time that we refuse to perpetuate a system of justice that allows
actually innocent people to remain in prison . . . .”223 The Supreme Court of
Iowa also acknowledged the individual’s interest in liberty and “remaining
free from underserved punishment” because “[h]olding a person who has
committed no crime in prison strikes the very essence of the constitutional
guarantee of substantive due process.”224 The states that still impose the death
penalty but have adopted a freestanding claim of actual innocence for all
defendants have come to the commonsense conclusion that a differentiation

216. Id.
217. Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1337.
218. Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 205.
219. Id.
220. “It would be a rather strange jurisprudence, in these circumstances, which
held that under our Constitution he could not be executed, but that he could spend the
rest of his life in prison.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 405 (1993).
221. Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 205.
222. Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 790 (Iowa 2018); Montoya v. Ulibarria,
142 P.3d 476, 484 (N.M. 2007).
223. Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 790.
224. Id. at 793; see also Engesser v. Young, 856 N.W.2d 471, 481–82 (S.D. 2014).
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based on the sentence is arbitrary and unjustified.225 All of these states have
recognized the serious constitutional implications of continuing to incarcerate
defendants who demonstrate their innocence and responded accordingly.
Missouri must do the same.
While it is well within the discretion of courts to expand habeas corpus
procedure to freestanding claims of actual innocence, Missouri need not wait
for courts to respond to this grave injustice. The Missouri legislature is just
as capable of exacting a cure as the Supreme Court of Missouri. The
alternative remedies to the paradoxical notion that it is lawful and
constitutional to enforce a life sentence against an innocent person are sewn
into the foundation of habeas corpus relief. If habeas corpus relief is a check
on a detention that violates the constitution and laws of the state, the logical
cure is to pass a statute that makes it unlawful to detain or execute a person
who can demonstrate his innocence post-conviction. This statute could be a
simple statement to that effect or more tailored to habeas corpus relief in
particular. A statute geared at habeas corpus would specifically expand relief
to freestanding claims of actual innocence regardless of whether the detainee
is subject to execution, a life sentence, or a term-of-years sentence. The most
important takeaway is that the law must be amended, either by common law
or statutory law, to address the procedural gap that currently exists in habeas
corpus and allows for such a grave injustice to be perpetuated against
innocents.

VI. CONCLUSION
The innocence movement has seen over 2400 exonerations since
1980.226 This number does not include individuals who have attempted to
exonerate themselves but failed due to inadequate evidence or procedural
technicalities such as the one highlighted in this Note. Given the ever-rising
number of exonerations, the importance of efficient but accurate habeas relief
cannot be understated. The interests that justify maintaining the status quo of
habeas relief, namely finality, do not survive careful scrutiny. The judicially
relied upon remedy of clemency, while somewhat successful for Mr. Lincoln,
is not a trustworthy friend to innocents and left Mr. Lincoln only partially
restored. For these reasons, it is incumbent upon the state that habeas reform
includes a pathway for freestanding claims of actual innocence regardless of
the sentence associated with the conviction.

225. See also Montoya, 142 P.3d at 484; Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla.
1991).
226. See Exonerations by Year, supra note 171.
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